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Abstract We critically review the recent debate between Doreen Fraser and David
Wallace on the interpretation of quantum field theory, with the aim of identifying
where the core of the disagreement lies. We show that, despite appearances, their
conflict does not concern the existence of particles or the occurrence of unitarily in-
equivalent representations. Instead, the dispute ultimately turns on the very definition
of what a quantum field theory is. We further illustrate the fundamental differences
between the two approaches by comparing them both to the Bohmian program in
quantum field theory.
Keywords Algebraic quantum field theory · Particle physics · Renormalization ·
Unitarily inequivalent representations
1 Introduction
The interpretation of relativistic quantum field theory (QFT) is a difficult task, since
it involves specific field-theoretic and relativistic issues on top of the usual quantum
puzzles found in non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM), such as the measurement
problem and non-locality. (Merely moving from QM to QFT obviously does not solve
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the latter puzzles, so any realist interpretation of QFT will have to provide an account
of them.) Similarly to the QM case (to some extent), different stances on these QFT
issues lead to different variants of the theory. Doreen Fraser and David Wallace have
recently debated over the best approach to QFT for foundational and interpretative
work, the former arguing in favor of the mathematically rigorous and physically am-
bitious approach of algebraic quantum field theory (AQFT), the latter defending the
more pragmatic approach of ‘conventional’ quantum field theory (CQFT), which is
described in most QFT textbooks and used by most working physicists in the domain.
The debate between Fraser and Wallace has the great merit of highlighting and fo-
cusing on some of the foundational and interpretative issues that appear within the
QFT framework, but which have been far less investigated than the usual ones already
present in QM. The upshot of their debate for the interpretation of QFT is, however,
far from clear and even somewhat confusing.
In this paper, we critically review this debate, mainly as expressed in [1], [2] and
[3] [4], hopefully clarifying along the way several important points for the interpre-
tation of QFT. In section 2, we will argue that, despite appearances, the disagreement
between Fraser and Wallace is not really concerned with the existence of particles (or
quanta). We will then progressively approach what we claim to be the core of their
disagreement, discussing first their diverging interpretations of renormalization (sec-
tion 3) and thereafter their differing views on the permissibility of cutoffs (section 4).
This crucial issue is intimately connected to the definition of the very project of QFT,
which we will discuss in section 5. In section 6, we will spell out what we take to be
the upshot of the debate for the foundation of QFT.
2 Where the conflict does not lie: Particle ontology
One of the most discussed interpretative issues of QFT concerns the extent to which
the theory can be understood in terms of particles (or in terms of the weaker notion
of quanta). A superficial look at the debate between Fraser and Wallace could lead
to the impression that one of their main points of disagreement precisely is the par-
ticle interpretation of QFT. After all, one of Fraser’s central claims is that a particle
ontology is incompatible with the theoretical principles of (any conceptually rigor-
ous) QFT (see especially her [5] paper), while Wallace’s defense of CQFT seems
to support just such an ontology, by arguing for the conceptual respectability of the
standard model of particle physics.
On closer inspection, however, this conflict turns out to be unsubstantial, because
Fraser and Wallace are actually speaking about different things. What Fraser [5] crit-
icizes is the idea that QFT could be interpreted in terms of a fundamental particle
notion, or, more precisely, in terms of quanta, that is, countable entities allowing
physical states to be characterized by well-defined Fock space occupation numbers.
Indeed, she rightly argues that a Fock space representation is in general and strictly
speaking only available for free, non-interacting QFT systems; central to her argu-
ment is the fact that free and interacting QFT systems involve unitarily inequivalent
representations (this can also be seen as a consequence of Haag’s theorem).
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Does Wallace [4] have in mind arguing for a fundamental ontology of particles
when he speaks of “taking particle physics seriously”? Clearly not. For one thing, he
does not deny the foundational importance of the existence of (‘infra-red’) unitarily
inequivalent representations ([4, 123-124]; we will come back to the role unitarily
inequivalent representations play in the debate below). More importantly, he does not
criticize Fraser’s anti-quanta argument per se, but only the conclusion she draws from
it as regards the question whether there could be approximate agreement on matters of
ontology between CQFT and (a possible future interacting model of) AQFT. Fraser
has given a negative answer to that question, insisting that “a theory according to
which quanta exist is not approximately equivalent to a theory according to which
quanta do not exist” [1, 560]. Wallace replies:
Well, maybe not, but it is approximately equivalent to a theory according to
which quanta do approximately exist! And if AQFT (more precisely, if this
supposed interacting algebraic quantum field theory) does not admit quanta
in at least some approximate sense, then so much the worse for it: the evidence
for the electron is reasonably conclusive. [4, 123]
This shows that Wallace is not in the business of defending a fundamental particle
interpretation of QFT. He is merely committed to the “approximate existence” of
particles, which means that particles are not basic entities in their own right, but “just
certain patterns of excitations in the [quantum] fields” [3, 73].1 Therefore, even if one
takes CQFT to be the best theory of the relevant domain (and accepts that we should
be ontologically committed to the entities that are said to exist according to our best
scientific theories), the resulting fundamental ontology will not be one of particles.2
We thus have an argument against the fundamentality of particles which is internal to
CQFT.
Furthermore, there is a second, more general argument, which is external to
CQFT. It derives from the fact that CQFT, by its very nature, cannot even pretend
to be a fundamental theory: as we will see below, CQFT generally goes together with
a short-distance cutoff assumption (it makes the theory far better defined by ‘freezing
out’ the high energy or short lenghtscale degrees of freedom that are responsible for
divergent behavior), which is naturally understood as indicating the breakdown of
the theory at some short lengthscales (renormalization theory then ensures the epis-
temic innocuousness of this assumption). This is usually expressed by saying that
CQFT is an effective (as opposed to fundamental) theory. [3, 46-50] illustrates the
status of CQFT by means of an analogy to classical mechanics (CM) and its rela-
tion to non-relativistic QM. When one approaches the classical limit of QM, one is
considering a certain regime where CM is approximately isomorphic to QM, in the
sense that predictions of CM are reasonably good approximations, or isomorphic to,
those of the lower level theory, QM. Wallace now applies the same argumentative
structure to CQFT, assuming that it breaks down at some small length scale where
1 Wallace and Timpson [6, 707] also emphasize the non-fundamental character of particles in QFT. In
contrast to [3,4], they even seem to advocate AQFT as a guide to fundamental ontology (711-712). This
reinforces the claim that an AQFT-fueled refusal of particles at the fundamental level is fully compatible
with a commitment to particles as non-fundamental entities.
2 Note that, despite its name, QFT does not straightforwardly support a field ontology either [7].
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another, as-yet-unknown physical theory X is supposed to come into the scene. Then,
there should be an isomorphism between the two, in the same way as there is a cer-
tain regime where CM is approximately isomorphic to QM, or in other words, there
should be a particular length-scale above which the predictions of CQFT are good
approximations to those of the theory X. According to Wallace, then, the ontology
of CQFT is the kind of pattern or structure that emerges from the deeper theory X.
Therefore, even if (contrary to what we saw in the previous paragraph) the basic on-
tology of CQFT included particles, particles would still not be truly fundamental, due
to the inherently non-fundamental character of CQFT.3
To sum up, Wallace clearly does not advocate the kind of (fundamental) particle
ontology that Fraser primarily attacks. However, the following passage shows that
she takes issue even with his modest commitment to (non-fundamental) particles:
Wallace considers the ‘particle’ concept to be an emergent concept [. . . ]. For
this to be a viable response, the cogency of the distinction between fundamen-
tal and less fundamental entities must be defended and a case must be made
for admitting additional, non-fundamental entities into our ontology. [5, 858]
But this obviously is a general concern about non-fundamental entities; it applies
to molecules, organisms, or planets no less than to particles (in Wallace’s sense). If
that were the main point of conflict between Fraser and Wallace, it would be hard
to understand why their debate should revolve around quantum field theory as much
as it does. Therefore, the existence of particles cannot be what this debate is about;
ultimately, both Fraser and Wallace—relying on arguments from AQFT and CQFT
respectively—agree about particles being non-fundamental in QFT.
3 Renormalization: Field-theoretic breakdown or underdetermination?
What, then, is the core of the disagreement between Fraser and Wallace? On a purely
methodological level, the central question is easily identified by looking at the ab-
stracts of [2] and [4]: is it AQFT or CQFT that should be subject to foundational
analysis? Now the previous section has shown that Fraser’s and Wallace’s disagree-
ment on this methodological question need not imply a disagreement on matters of
ontology, because AQFT and CQFT simply address different kinds of ontological
questions: while the former is concerned with fundamental ontology, the latter yields
what could be called an effective ontology.
However, there is still a substantial point of ontological disagreement, which has
to do with the interpretation of renormalization techniques, and in particular, the ap-
plicability of field theoretic concepts at lengthscales beyond the cutoff length. Con-
sider the following argument by Wallace:
1. We have a very well confirmed theory (the Standard Model, understood
as a CQFT), one of whose central claims is that field degrees of freedom
are frozen out at sufficiently short lengthscales.
3 This does not mean, however, that no ontological lessons can be drawn from an effective theory like
CQFT. We will return to this point in section 5.
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2. As good scientific realists, we should tentatively accept that claim as ap-
proximately true.
3. Since AQFT denies that claim, its basic structure is wrong.
4. So no wonder that we can’t construct empirically adequate theories within
that structure! [4, 120]
In her response, Fraser [2, 133] criticizes the move from 1 to 2. This move, she
claims, is based on the so-called ‘no miracles’ argument for scientific realism, accord-
ing to which the empirical success of our well-confirmed scientific theories would
be inexplicable unless these theories were approximately true. Against this, Fraser
advances the argument from underdetermination, which states that, if mutually in-
compatible theories make the same empirical predictions, empirical success does not
support the claim that any particular one of them is approximately true.
Before discussing the different roles that renormalization plays in these two op-
posing arguments, let us note that both of them have an internal weakness, which is
acknowledged by their respective proponents. On the one hand, Wallace admits that
his move from 1 to 2 is a little too quick, because “CQFT, in itself, doesn’t actu-
ally require the existence of a cutoff; it just tells us that assuming a cutoff suffices
to make the theory well-defined” [4, 120]. Indeed, one of the key insights of modern
renormalization theory (repeatedly stressed by both Wallace and Fraser) is that the
empirical content of CQFT is largely insensitive to what precisely happens at small
lengthscales. Therefore, “it is consistent with the CQFT framework that the theory’s
degrees of freedom after all remain defined on arbitrarily short lengthscales” (ibid.).
On the other hand, Fraser has to acknowledge that there is no actual underdetermi-
nation between AQFT and CQFT, because so far, only the latter makes empirical
predictions about interacting systems in four spacetime dimensions [2, 132]. We are
thus at present confronted with merely a potential underdetermination, premised on
the assumption that one day a realistic AQFT model will be found.
That the interpretation and the implications of the renormalization group methods
constitute a central point of disagreement in the Fraser-Wallace debate is highlighted
by the opposed role they play in the above no miracles argument by Wallace and in
Fraser’s main objection to it. According to Wallace, renormalization theory removes
all the motivation for developing realistic AQFT models in the domain of CQFT (i.e.
well above the short lengthscale cutoff), since the renormalization group methods
show that the (hypothetical) AQFT models will have the same empirical predictions
as CQFT (in the relevant domain). So, even if CQFT is strictly speaking consistent
with a full field-theoretic description at all lenghtscales, this possibility does not re-
ally matter, thanks to renormalization. However, according to Fraser, this constitutes
a clear case of theory underdetermination by empirical evidence, so that she regards
renormalization theory as supporting her objection to Wallace’s no miracles argu-
ment.
At this stage, two important remarks are in order. First, let us repeat that, as Wal-
lace [4, 121] clearly points out, there is no actual underdetermination, since there
is no AQFT model reproducing the empirical predictions of CQFT (e.g. the Stan-
dard Model) for the time being. Second, as Fraser [2, 131] argues, there might be
some other motivations besides novel empirical predictions for looking for an alter-
6 Matthias Egg et al.
native to CQFT (even in the domain well above the short length scale cutoff), such
as coherence with certain theoretical (e.g. relativistic) principles or ontological clar-
ity.4 (For instance, this latter is the principal motivation behind Bohmian mechanics,
which makes the same predictions as ‘conventional’ or textbook QM; indeed, Wal-
lace [4, ftn. 14], who privileges the Everett interpretation, seems to recognize that his
point about renormalization might be weakened in the cases of the other main realist
approaches to the measurement problem such as Bohmian mechanics or dynamical
collapse approaches, e.g. GRW. We will return to this point in section 5 below.)
All this tends to show that both Wallace’s no miracles argument and Fraser’s ar-
gument from underdetermination—as well as the respective roles of renormalization
theory in these arguments—are inconclusive. This might also show that their diver-
gent interpretation of the renormalization group methods—however central to the
Fraser-Wallace debate—does not constitute the real bottom line of the discussion. In-
deed, as explicitly recognized by both [2, 127] and [4, 121], what is really at stake is
the status of cutoffs in QFT, to which we now turn.
4 The status of cutoffs
An important source of inspiration (and justification) for renormalization methods in
CQFT is the successful application of such methods in condensed matter physics,
where there is good reason to assume that the field theoretic treatment fails at length-
scales small enough for the atomic structure of matter to become relevant. Wallace
claims that “nothing prevents us telling exactly the same story in particle physics,
provided only that something freezes out the short-distance degrees of freedom on
some lengthscale far below what current experimental physics can probe” [4, 118].
In this line of thought, assuming the short-distance breakdown of QFT, i.e. assuming
a short-distance cutoff, is a crucial step in the renormalization process and constitutes
therefore a key element of the conceptual grounding and of the explanatory frame-
work of CQFT:
This, in essence, is how modern particle physics deals with the renormaliza-
tion problem [footnote deleted]: it is taken to presage an ultimate failure of
quantum field theory at some short lengthscale, and once the bare existence
of that failure is appreciated, the whole of renormalization theory becomes
unproblematic, and indeed predictively powerful in its own right. [4, 119]
However, Fraser detects an important disanalogy between condensed matter physics
and CQFT: “in the condensed matter case, independent evidence for the existence of
atoms plays a pivotal role. [. . . ] There is no analogue of this evidence in the QFT
case; we do not possess evidence of this sort that QFT breaks down at short distance
scales” [4, 118].
Actually, Wallace does cite some evidence for an eventual breakdown of QFT at
short distance scales:
4 [8] also privileges AQFT on ontological grounds.
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Once we get down to Planckian lengthscales, the fiction that spacetime is non-
dynamical and that gravity can be ignored will become unsustainable. What-
ever our sub-Planckian physics looks like (string theory? twistor theory? loop
quantum gravity? non-commutative geometry? causal set theory? something
as-yet-undreamed-of?) there are pretty powerful reasons not to expect it to
look like quantum field theory on a classical background spacetime. [4, 120-
121]
Presumably, Fraser does not accept this as evidence in the same sense as the evi-
dence for the existence of atoms, because it is not experimental evidence. Now we are
not opposed to the idea that experimental evidence should be given more weight than
theoretical evidence,5 but one must be careful not to exaggerate the privilege granted
to experimental evidence, because such an attitude (exemplified by [11]) would un-
dermine the motivation of giving any relevance to the results of AQFT in the first
place. Instead, theoretical considerations of the type cited by Wallace should be taken
seriously, especially in contexts where no direct experimental evidence is available,
as is the case for the question that concerns us here (the breakdown of QFT at small
lengthscales).
Once this is acknowledged, the theoretical evidence in favor of a breakdown of
QFT at the Planck scale can be evaluated against the (equally theoretical) evidence
in favor of the basic commitments of AQFT, which include the claim that a field
theoretic treatment is adequate for all lengthscales. Fraser’s general argument for
accepting the ontological commitments of AQFT (and disregarding those of CQFT)
“is that QFT is a unification project; the goal of the project is to formulate a theory that
incorporates both special relativistic and quantum principles” [2, 131].6 She goes on
to claim that AQFT satisfies the minimal criteria for success in this unification project
(obviously, since it is one of its explicit aims), but CQFT does not (CQFT with cutoff
is strictly speaking not relativistic, because it is not Poincare´ covariant; see section 5
below).
We are thus faced with two conflicting bodies of theoretical evidence concerning
the breakdown of QFT at short lengthscales, and both of them are based on consider-
ations of unification: unification of quantum theory and special relativity in Fraser’s
case, unification of quantum theory and general relativity in Wallace’s case. The cru-
cial difference is that Fraser takes the unification of quantum theory and special rela-
tivity to be part of the very definition of what QFT is, and therefore to be privileged
over other considerations, such as gravitational considerations, that are “external” to
the QFT project [1, 552]. By contrast, Wallace mentions the unification of quantum
theory and general relativity precisely to show that the search for a truly fundamental
theory has to move beyond the QFT framework.
5 See [9], [10] for a recent version of scientific realism based on this idea. Section 9.3 of the latter work
also contains a deeper investigation of the interplay between experimental and theoretical considerations
in the interpretation of QFT.
6 Fraser might disagree with our characterization of this kind of evidence as theoretical, as she claims
that “this unification project is also empirical, broadly construed, insofar as there is indirect empirical
support for special relativity and its theoretical principles and for non-relativistic quantum theory and its
theoretical principles” [2, 131]. However, given that there is indirect empirical support for general relativity
as well, Wallace’s above-mentioned arguments also count as “empirical” in this sense.
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This actually touches the heart of the disagreement between Fraser and Wallace.
Since Fraser primarily considers QFT as the project of combining the principles of
quantum theory with those of special relativity, she cannot accept cutoffs since they
destroy Poincare´ covariance and thereby contradict the very idea of this project. (She
might be willing to accept them in the last resort, after it has been shown that the
QFT project as she understands it fails). On the other hand, according to Wallace,
such in principle understanding of QFT is illegitimate in the face of its failure (for
the time being) to account for the QFT phenomenology (i.e. the Standard Model). By
contrast, this latter is naturally accounted for within the framework of CQFT under-
stood as an effective theory breaking down at short lenthscales, and possibly approx-
imating some deeper, more fundamental theory (e.g. one that would take quantum
gravitational effects into account). In this context, assuming a short-distance cutoff
implements this effective understanding, which can well be motivated by ‘external’
considerations. Renormalization theory ensures that the details of this implementa-
tion are irrelevant for the predictive and explanatory power of CQFT ([3] alludes to
some broad structuralist understanding of theories in order to justify the explanatory
power of an approximate theory like CQFT).
Therefore, we see that Fraser and Wallace ultimately disagree about what QFT
is, and this disagreement manifests itself in their opposite understanding of the short-
distance cutoff. Before continuing our discussion of their disagreement about the very
nature of QFT, we end this section by highlighting an important point of agreement
as regards the cutoffs. Somewhat paradoxically at first sight, Fraser and Wallace re-
join on the status of the long-distance (or ‘infra-red’) cutoff. Indeed, if Fraser holds
both short- and long-distance cutoffs as unsatisfactory, Wallace seems to think that
the (external, mainly cosmological) motivations for the latter are far weaker than for
the former (observational data, i.e. experimental evidence, actually seems to speak in
favor of an open, infinite universe, that is, against any genuine long-distance cutoff).
As a consequence, Wallace seriously considers the possibility of the existence of in-
finitely many QFT degrees of freedom and therefore of inequivalent representations.
(Since the Stone-von Neumann theorem does not apply to infinite dimensional cases,
the quantization of a theory with infinitely many degrees of freedom leads to many
unitarily inequivalent representations of the relevant algebra encoding the appropri-
ate commutation relations.) It is interesting to note that the existence of inequivalent
representations precisely constitutes one of the original motivations for AQFT, which
focuses on the algebraic rather than representational structures of the theory. In short,
the foundational importance of unitarily inequivalent representations is part of the
common ground shared by both Fraser and Wallace. We will come back to this point
in section 6.
5 What exactly is QFT?
As we have seen in the previous section, Fraser intends QFT as the theory that best
unifies the principles of quantum mechanics and special relativity (SR). From this
naturally follows the definition of what QFT should be: in order to be an acceptable
QFT, a theory must incorporate the principles of both quantum mechanics and spe-
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cial relativity, in short QFT = QM + SR. This definition finds its roots in the history
of quantum field theory,7 since already from the Twenties and the Thirties physicists
were trying to incorporate within the domain of quantum mechanics the treatment of
the electromagnetic field, given the fact that standard QM does not provide any treat-
ment of relativistic particles. Thus, a quantum theory able to describe these particles
was needed, and QFT is the first theory which yields this results, providing a suc-
cessful treatment of photons. In addition to these historical considerations that Fraser
considers to justify her definition, it should be noted that it is congenial to her argu-
ment, since among the variants of QFT she considers only AQFT satisfies it, being a
project directly aimed to find a consistent (explicitly) relativistic QFT. Certainly this
fact plays a pivotal role in arguing why one should prefer the axiomatic variant over
the rivals.
Showing how the interaction picture is inconsistent as a consequence of Haag’s
theorem, Fraser [1, 544-553] discusses various modalities to solve the inconsistency:
on the one hand we have a formal or ‘principled’ response (AQFT), exemplified by
the Glimm and Jaffe model, and on the other hand, the approaches, to which CQFT
belongs, relying on renormalization methods and in particular on the introduction of
cutoffs to solve the issue. The introduction of cutoffs implies that the theory under
consideration is not covariant under Poincare´ transformations and in brief that it is
not relativistic.8 According to Fraser’s definition of QFT, if a theory is not relativistic,
it cannot be a good candidate for a QFT.
Therefore, Fraser does not only claim that we should prefer AQFT for its clarity
in solving the inconsistency of the interaction picture, but she also gives another argu-
ment, namely that AQFT is genuinely relativistic and thereby, unlike its rivals, fulfills
the minimal criterion for being a QFT in the first place. This shows how Fraser’s
definition of a QFT plays a crucial role in her argument.
A radical consequence of this approach is that a great variety of different formu-
lations and approaches to QFT are simply ruled out in principle. Apart from CQFT,
the Bohmian approach to QFT constitutes another good example of such an alterna-
tive ruled out from the start (for a recent and accessible overview of this approach
to QFT, see [14]). This latter approach actually highlights important aspects of the
discussion, because the Bohmian versions of QFT share crucial features with both
CQFT and AQFT.
Let us discuss these similarities in turn.
On the one hand, the Bohmian QFTs rely completely on the mathematical struc-
tures of CQFT, meaning that all the perturbation and scattering theory on which the
standard QFT is based is simply retained without modifications in this theoretical
framework. This fact implies that, as in the non-relativistic case, the Bohmian theo-
ries add to the standard quantum theory a set of (so-called ‘primitive’) variables and
provide their dynamical laws of motion, leaving untouched the mathematical machin-
ery of both standard QM and QFT. The consequence for these Bohmian quantum field
theories is that they are not genuinely relativistic and therefore fall outside Fraser’s
7 The reader interested in historical aspects of the theory should refer to [12] and [13]
8 See [3, 50-52] for different ways to address the problem of Poincare´ non-covariance from the per-
spective of CQFT.
10 Matthias Egg et al.
definition of QFT. Furthermore, the fact that these theories rely on the very same
regularization techniques as CQFT makes them in some sense explicitly effective,
rather than fundamental theories [15]. This raises the issue of the ontological impact
of (explicitly) effective theories.
According to the Bohmian approach, one should be able to provide a clear (even
if non-fundamental) ontological picture for effective theories too. More particularly,
such a picture should be able to provide an explicit account of the empirical data that
constitute the basis for empirical confirmation, by introducing primitive variables
referring to positions in 3-dimensional physical space, the temporal development of
which is then described by the theory. (This is the spirit of John S. Bell’s quest for
‘local beables’, which is echoed by the so-called ‘primitive ontology’ approach in
the current debate on the foundations of quantum theory; see [16] for an up-to-date
review.)
On the other hand, Bohmian QFTs share with AQFT a striving for the kind of
conceptual and ontological clarity which Fraser and others find lacking in CQFT (see
section 3 above). By a selection of either a particle or a field ontology the Bohmian
QFTs aim to construct a theory without ambiguous notions appearing in the axioms
and able to solve the measurement problem, which carries over intact in the passage
from non-relativistic QM to QFT (for a recent discussion of the measurement prob-
lem in QFT see [17]), following the strategy applied in the non-relativistic case. These
theories are by construction empirically equivalent to any regularized QFT, so they
are able to provide a qualitative description of the phenomenology of the standard
model of particle physics in terms of the motion of local beables, and thus, they are
able to explain in a clear manner the phenomena of particle creation and annihilation.
Exactly as in the case of AQFT, these Bohmian quantum field theories try to pro-
pose a clear solution to the conceptual issues affecting CQFT. They do so by starting
from the definition of the local beables of the theory and their respective dynamical
equations.
Clearly the Bohmian and the algebraic approaches to QFT aim to solve different
problems of CQFT:9 on the one hand, one has the usual problems of QM which
are simply inherited by QFT such as the measurement problem and the lack of a
clear ontology. These problems imply that QFT is not a theory able to provide a
clear description of the physical processes taking place at the subatomic level. For
instance, between the free asymptotic states at minus and plus infinity, CQFT does not
yield a description of the motion and interactions of the quantum objects going on in
scattering processes. Bohmian approaches to QFT aim at addressing these problems.
On the other hand, AQFT starts from a rigorous unification of QM and SR trying
to construct a theory which is genuinely relativistic and able to remove the cutoffs,
giving less importance to the ontological shortcomings of CQFT.
However, one should acknowledge that both these two research programs are wor-
thy of consideration, since they might provide valuable solutions to the wide spectrum
of the well-known problems affecting CQFT. More importantly, since these two alter-
native approaches to QFT rely on different assumptions and solve different problems
9 These two approaches have clearly a different scope and in some sense Bohmian QFT is less ambitious
than AQFT, but far more empirically successful, since it is built to be empirically equivalent to CQFT as
explained above.
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of the same theory, it would be extremely useful for the future developments in QFT
to make an attempt in unifying these two frameworks looking for a QFT with a clear
ontology in the spirit of the primitive ontology approach and grounded in a rigorous
mathematics, avoiding the ambiguities of the standard approach to QFT.10
According to Fraser’s approach to QFT, however, whatever the effective ontolog-
ical clarity provided by the Bohmian versions of QFT, they should be dismissed for
foundational work in the QFT domain since they are not relativistic. This straight-
forward consequence suggests a few critical remarks about Fraser’s stance on QFT.
First, the Bohmian approach to QFT can be understood as an on-going research pro-
gram, in some respect with an analogous status to the AQFT research program, since
both these approaches to QFT aim to improve the conceptual and technical issues
present in the standard formulation of the theory, even though they try to solve dif-
ferent problems and move from diverse metaphysical stances. Furthermore, there is
current research in order to develop a relativistic version of Bohmian QFT (see [18])
and considerable philosophical work which tries to make clear in which sense this
theory can be made compatible with special relativity. To this regard, it is impor-
tant to stress that BQFTs maintain by construction at least two crucial feature of SR:
Bohmian particles11 do not travel faster than the velocity of light and the quantum
equilibrium hypothesis ensures that superluminal signaling is completely avoided.
Then, the cogent problem of the pilot-wave approach is to find a consistent way to
implement Lorentz invariance, and many efforts in this direction have been made (for
instance [22]). Secondly, one has to acknowledge that even if these theories do im-
ply a preferred reference frame, it is a well-argued fact that there is no possibility in
principle for an observer to determine it experimentally. The predictions of Bohmian
QFTs (just like those of CQFT) are therefore operationally Lorentz invariant, so that
the objection from SR (at the heart of the motivation for AQFT) is somewhat weak-
ened.
Finally, and although this is still a hotly debated issue, it is fair to say that Bell’s
theorem and its consequences on locality should at least inspire some caution as
regards the ultimate compatibility of the principles of QM with those of SR (see
[23] and [24] for recent surveys of this debate, and [25] for an accessible introduction
to the tension between QM and SR). In other words, it is still a largely open question
whether or not it is even possible to find a theory which combines the principles of
both QM and SR. Fraser is not committed to a positive answer, and she stresses the
need for further work on the issue:
Since QFT= QT [quantum theory] + SR, the project of formulating quantum
field theory cannot be considered successful until either a consistent theory
that incorporates both relativistic and quantum principles has been obtained
or a convincing argument has been made that such a theory is not possible.
10 A possible proposal could be to cast the existing Bohmian QFTs in the framework of Wightman’s
axioms as it has been suggested by Nino Zanghı´ (personal communication).
11 It is interesting to consider that both in Bell’s first pilot-wave model ([19]) as well as in the Dirac Sea
formulation of BQFT ([20]) bosons are not part of the ontology, fermions are sufficient in order to explain
and describe observed phenomena. Bosons are instead part of the ontology in the Bell-type QFT, where
they receive the same particle status as the fermions. For a detailed technical and conceptual expositions
of these ideas see [21].
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The big foundational question lying in the background is, of course, whether
the principles of quantum theory and special relativity are consistent. I do
not presume that this question has a positive answer. However, I do maintain
that the project of developing QFT cannot be considered complete until this
central foundational question has been answered. [1, 550]
Almost anyone interested in the foundations of QFT would concur with Fraser
here on the importance of investigating to what extent the principles of quantum the-
ory and special relativity are consistent. But this provides no ground for dismissing
alternative developing research programs that do not start with Fraser’s strict defini-
tion of QFT; they may well be of significant interest from both a physical and philo-
sophical perspective. Thus, as physics stands nowadays (in particular given Bell’s
theorem), it seems wise not to rule out these different strategies to find a better and
more rigorous formulation of QFT in both technical and conceptual sense.
6 Upshot of the debate for the foundations of QFT
While the main purpose of our paper has been to identify the precise locus of dis-
agreement between Fraser and Wallace, we have also discovered important areas of
common ground between them. The first one has to do with the non-fundamental
status of particles in QFT (discussed in section 2), the second one with the rejec-
tion of a long-distance cutoff and the resulting appearance of unitarily inequivalent
representations even in renormalized QFT (discussed at the end of section 4). These
two areas are actually connected. To see how, consider the following methodological
consequence that Wallace draws from the existence of unitarily inequivalent repre-
sentations:
This is one place where my earlier disclaimer is relevant: this kind of long-
distance (or ‘infra-red’) divergence arises because the free-field vacuum and
the interacting-field vacuum [. . . ] differ on arbitrarily long lenghtscales and
so are unitarily inequivalent. This really is a case where algebraic methods are
required to understand what is going on. [4, 121]
Wallace’s earlier disclaimer concerns the distinction between AQFT and QFT
studied by algebraic methods. His point here is clear enough: regarding QFT as an
effective theory—hence best characterized by CQFT—does not prevent one from us-
ing algebraic methods (and, for that matter, to recognize that the theory possibly
contains infinitely many degrees of freedom and has many inequivalent representa-
tions). But Wallace actually goes further than that when he claims that his purpose
has not been “to suggest that philosophy of quantum field theory done in the AQFT
framework has nothing to teach us. On the contrary, much—perhaps most—of that
work probably transfers across just fine to CQFT” [4, 124]. In particular, there are
many precise results obtained within the AQFT framework highlighting the difficul-
ties with the notion of particles or quanta in the context of QFT, and Wallace clearly
thinks they transfer to CQFT (see his [3, section 5]). So, partly based on these results,
and as we have stressed in section 2, neither Wallace nor Fraser (a fortiori) think the
Particles, Cutoffs and Inequivalent Representations 13
notion of particles or quanta is fundamental in any sense. This is an important moral
of their debate.
As a further note, we would like to stress, however, that the impact of this moral
actually depends on the ontological meaning one gives to the quantum formalism
(algebraic or otherwise) within which these results are phrased—that is, it depends
on the solution to the quantum measurement problem one favors. (As already men-
tioned, Wallace—but not Fraser—is clear about that: he favors the Everett interpreta-
tion, within which he is happy to accept that particles or quanta are not fundamental.)
For instance, the Bohmian approach to QFT mentioned in section 5 does not reject
the validity of the above-mentioned AQFT results about particles (they are mostly
mathematical results), but it offers an alternative understanding of these results (in
particular, in the Bohmian context, quantum vectors and operators do not straightfor-
wardly refer to something in the world, see [26]). Of course, to the extent that the
Bohmian versions of QFT rely on a Fock space representation, the issue of unitarily
inequivalent representations still has to be addressed (see [15]; this seems to be also
valid for the dynamical collapse approach to QFT). Both the measurement problem
and the existence of unitarily inequivalent representations need to be taken seriously.
In our search for the core of the disagreement between Fraser and Wallace, we
found that they ultimately disagree about what QFT is. Is the bottom line of this
debate therefore merely a verbal point on where (not) to attach the label ‘QFT’?
Certainly not. As we sought to show in sections 3 and 4, there are substantial issues
about the interpretation of renormalization methods, in particular, the short-distance
cutoff implemented in CQFT. Regardless of whether one thinks that this excludes
CQFT from the class of genuine QFTs, one should acknowledge the non-fundamental
character of CQFT brought out by these methods. Connecting this to our discussion
in section 5 leads us to a final important lesson from the debate between Fraser and
Wallace: at least at the present stage of development, not only fundamental but also
effective theories should be allowed to inform our ontology.
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